Introduction
The application of survival analysis models onto credit-related problems is not new (for example, see Banasik et al. (1999) , Pennington-Cross (2010) ) and is welcomed for its ability to take into account factors that are inherent in the modelling of credit risk and the prediction of credit events, where regression methods are unable to. First, survival models are able to account for censoring, which allows for a realistic and practical model to be developed. Second, they are able to incorporate time-dependent variables with ease, which will allow the inclusion of time-dependent accountspecific covariates as well as time-dependent macroeconomic variables in credit models. When this is combined with simulation, a plausible platform for stress testing is created, as proposed by Rodriguez and Trucharte (2007) , Leow et al. (2011) and Crook (2013a, 2013b) . Third, and most crucially, survival models are able to generate probabilities of how likely an event will occur over time, conditional on the event not having occurred before, and this provides a dynamic framework for the prediction of credit events (e.g. default or customer churn of credit loans, repossession or early-prepayment for mortgage loans). Because the likelihood of the credit event occurring over time can be estimated, the corresponding losses (McDonald et al. (2010) ) or profits (Ma et al. (2010) ) can also be predicted. In terms of how well survival models predict, there has been some work done specifically to compare its prediction to that of regression models: Stepanova and Thomas (2002) looked at the model performances in the prediction of early prepayment and default of personal loans; Bellotti and Crook (2009) looked at model performances in the prediction of default of credit card loans. Both papers found that survival models are able to predict better than static regression models.
This work does not attempt to revisit the advantages of survival models over their regression counterparts -that much has been established in the literature over different retail products. The work here differs from the existing literature in two ways. First, we have a rich source of credit card loan data that goes from 2002 to 2011, and so encompasses the credit crisis from 2008, which is not commonly available. Macroeconomic indicators over time will show a large difference in values, and it would be interesting to explore how these large and unexpected changes would affect default models and their predictions. Second, we investigate the stability of survival model parameter estimates before and after the credit crisis. Using a portfolio of active credit cards observed between January 2002 and March 2011, we investigate whether parameter estimates change over the crisis period, and whether the inclusion of time-varying covariates representing the economy are able to adequately account for changes to debtors propensity to default. By separately and independently estimating a survival model for periods before and since the start of the credit crisis, i.e. 2002 to 2007 and 2008 to 2011 respectively, we use the Chow Test (more details in Section 4.1)
to check for statistical differences between the two sets of parameter estimates. To illustrate how the two sets of parameter estimates are different, we apply each survival model developed onto a common test set to get the average predicted probabilities over the (duration) time of the loan.
During the course of this work, population drift, and how it might affect parameter estimates, is also considered as a related issue, due to the differing types of debtors securing credit accounts before and during the credit crisis. However, because of the large variations in macroeconomic conditions that was seen in our period of interest, it is also possible that changes in distributions of probabilities are due to the changes in these macroeconomic variables. We investigate the effects of either by selecting two cohorts, representing a set of accounts accepted during a non-downturn period and a downturn period, and estimating a survival model for each period. We then create test sets based on each training set, by holding constant either the cohort quality or the macroeconomic conditions, and compare the distribution of predicted probabilities to see how the distributions shift due to changes in cohort quality or economic conditions. We find macroeconomic conditions do affect probabilities of default, and could affect different groups of debtors in different ways.
Methodology
We use data gathered at regular, discrete monthly points in time, and the default event is recorded in a particular month with reference to the month the account was open. Therefore we estimate the survival models in discrete time. Another advantage of discrete time rather than continuous time survival models is a much lower computational time in model estimation. This is important because we deal with a large dataset.
Let τ i P be the probability that an individual account i goes into default at duration time (of loan) τ , given that default has not happened up to time 1 − τ , and the final model developed is given in
where τ α represents the effect of time on the odds of default; i X is a vector which represents the time-independent, account-dependent covariates, i.e. application variables; . By doing so, we allow the relationship between effect on time and the odds of default to be very flexible with an added advantage of allowing for prediction beyond the maximum duration time that is observed in the training set. A number of model variations were considered in the course of this work, mainly experimenting with the way the macroeconomic variables were included in the model. Lags of between 3 and 12 months were considered, and to address the possible correlation between macroeconomic variables, both levels and 12 th differences, lagged or otherwise, of each macroeconomic variable were examined.
Data
The data is supplied by a major UK bank and is a random sample of credit cards that were issued in the UK between 2002 and 2010. It consists of almost 538,000 unique credit card accounts and each account is tracked monthly up to March 2011, or until the time the credit card account is closed, whichever is earlier. Common application variables are available: type of employment, length of time the debtor has been with the bank, income at application and age at application, among others.
Because each account is updated monthly, we also have behavioural variables, including repayment amount, credit limit and outstanding balance, from which further behavioural indicators could be inferred, for example, how frequently the account misses payment(s) over its entire history. Any behavioural variables included in the model are lagged by 3 months.
Although default information is available from the dataset, it is not consistently defined across the entire dataset. Therefore, a monthly minimum repayment amount is defined and is used to define arrears and default. This minimum repayment amount is 2.5% of the previous month's outstanding balance or £5, whichever is higher, unless the account is in credit, in which case the minimum repayment amount is £0, or the account has an outstanding balance of less than £5, in which case the minimum repayment amount would be the full outstanding amount. An account is said to be in arrears if it does not make the minimum payment. A default is said to occur if and when an account goes three months in arrears (not necessarily consecutive). Note that this definition of default is not the conventional "three consecutive months of missed payment", but is acceptable as financial institutions are not bound to this definition of default (Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (2004) , Paragraphs 452-456). As the work here only focuses on the default event, we do not specify the transitions between states of arrears in the preceding months; further details can be found in Leow and Crook (2014) .
Training and test set splits
The dataset is used in a number of ways here. In order to accommodate the lagged behavioural covariates, only accounts that are observed for longer than three months since each was opened are included.
First, the dataset is split into two training sets (see Table 1 ). The first consists of accounts that training sets represent portfolios of loans that were accepted before and during the credit crisis, since we expect bank policies and acceptance decisions to change slightly over the years, with distinguished differences before and since the start of the credit crisis. 
Macroeconomic variables
The macroeconomic variables considered are given in Table 2 . The main source of macroeconomic variables is the Office of National Statistics (ONS), supplemented by data from Bank of England (BOE), Nationwide and the European Commission (EC) where appropriate. The non-seasonally adjusted series is selected unless unavailable because the default indicator is not seasonally adjusted. Based on commentary from key industry contacts, UK banks increase their market share by lowering cut-off thresholds on application scorecards and extending credit for current borrowers, so this is taken into account with the inclusion of total consumer credit outstanding. In order to reduce the impact of trends, the macroeconomic variables are included in the model as its 12 th difference, lagged 3 months. Interaction terms between selected macroeconomic variables and application variables are also considered. 
Results

Parameter estimates
The parameter estimates from training sets I and II representing accounts that were accepted before the crisis and since the crisis started respectively, are given in Table 3 Due to confidentiality agreements, we are unable to detail all variables used in the model. The application variables are fairly stable, with most of the younger borrowers not significantly different from each other before the crisis, but becoming significant since the crisis. Variable X is an interesting categorical variable which has its sign changed before and during the crisis period.
Employment status of the borrower does not seem to have much effect on default probability. The parameters on the behavioural variables are very stable, with very similar estimates over the two models. On the other hand, the parameters on the macroeconomic variables are not, and vary in terms of statistical insignificance over the two periods, as well as in terms of parameter estimates signs. Given the instability of these macroeconomic variables, it is not surprising to see that most of the interaction terms are statistically insignificant. Based on information from key industry contacts, we know the credit cards portfolio experienced a macroeconomic downturn two to three years earlier than that of the credit crisis (c.f. Figure A1 in the Appendix), and this would not be reflected in the significance of general macroeconomic variables. However, perhaps due to the way the training sets were defined, this effect is not obviously captured by the covariates that were used in the model. Although it is possible to try and include more economic variables that are relevant to the type of loan here, e.g. economic indicators on a household level or retail loans write off rates, most of these variables are either not available for as far back as our dataset period, or are only available on an annual basis.
Chow test
The Chow Test is a test of equality between parameter estimates of two linear regression models developed on different datasets, first developed by Chow (1960) . An equivalent test for use in logistic regression models is the Chow Test Analogue, given in DeMaris (2004) 
The null hypothesis states that the parameter estimates from training sets I and II are equal, i.e. The results 1 reject the null hypothesis, i.e. the parameter estimates of models developed on training sets I and II are statistically significantly different from each other.
We also look at the predicted probabilities of default as predicted by the two models. By applying the parameter estimates onto the test set, predicted probabilities of default for each discrete time point of each account can be calculated. The predicted probability of default at each time point is then calculated to be the mean probability of default for all accounts that are at risk of default at that time, given in Equation 6. The predicted probability of default from the models based on training sets I and II are applied onto the test set to see how the predictions differ. Together with the observed default rate from the test set, all three are plotted on the same graph, given in Figure 1 . We note that although there are potentially, two very different models within the period of the test set, we are not comparing how well each model predicts, but how differently the two models predict for each other. An alternative would be to have two separate test sets for each training period, but that would not provide the same level of comparison which is achieved here.
The differences between the two predicted hazard rate plots in Figure 1 are due to parameterising the same model specification using two different training sets; the test set is the same. In other words the differences are due to differences in the estimated parameters between the two training periods: pre-and post-crisis. We see that the model based on pre-crisis accounts significantly underestimate default rates in the first 12 months of a loan but estimates well for the rest of the loan, while the model based on crisis accounts slightly over-estimates default rates in the first 30 months of the loan and under-estimate default rates after that.
Hazard Distributions
We now investigate the sources of changes in the distributions of hazard rates before and after the crisis. The models that have been estimated using training data are equations 3 and 4. Simplifying, these may be represented as equations 7 and 8 as follows:
where it y denotes the logit of the hazard probabilities, ) ( 2 1 i i x x denotes the vector of application variables for individuals i from period 1 (2), that is in the pre-(post-) crisis period and
denotes the vector of macroeconomic variables measured in period 1 (2) respectively, lagged l months.
)
( 2 1 β β represent the vector of parameters It can now be seen that there are at least three sources of differences between the distributions of hazards before and after the crisis. These are differences in the estimated parameters, differences in the distributions of the application variables (X values) and differences in the distributions of the macroeconomic variables (Z values). To isolate the effects of each we hold two constant and vary the third, for each source, in turn. Note that for these predictions we omitted the behavioural variables as we are not able to predict how these variables would react to the changes in macroeconomic variables. The interaction terms are also updated with the changed macroeconomic conditions correspondingly.
The specific set-up is shown in Table Table 5 ). If we compare test sets A and D, both test sets have the same parameter values ( 1 β ) and both have the same values of the macroeconomic variables (2008) (2009) (2010) (2011) , so the differences in predicted hazards are due to differences in the application variables (X). The results show that moving from the pre-to the post-crisis values the median (and the mean) of the hazard rates decreased considerably for the default and nondefault samples whilst the mode actually increased for both groups. The spreads also fell.
Comparing test sets C and B, we again condition on 1 β but now fix the fix the macroeconomic variables at pre-crisis levels (2002) (2003) (2004) (2005) . Moving from the pre-to the post-crisis cohorts, the median and the modal hazards both fell. We also make the comparisons by fixing the model to be the post-crisis model ( 2 β ) by comparing test sets F and G. Now conditioning on the parameters gained from the crisis cohort and moving from the pre-to the post-crisis cohorts, we see only very slight changes in all values of mean, median, mode and spread. This is the same case when we compare test sets E and H. In conclusion, the effects of changes in cohorts in the test set depend on the cohort used to train the model. Assuming the bank does become more stringent with its acceptance policy since the crisis, it is likely that the post-crisis cohort is less risky, which the model developed on non-downturn data ( 1 β ) is suggesting. However, the model developed on downturn data ( 2 β ) is not able to differentiate between cohorts even when macroeconomic conditions are held constant. 
Concluding remarks
This work investigates the stability of parameter estimates of discrete survival models developed on a large portfolio of credit card loans provided by a major UK bank, consisting of accounts that were accepted between 2002 and 2010, and observed up to early 2011. By developing two survival models, one based on data from before the crisis and the other based on data from since the crisis started, we use the chow test, a statistical test to test for differences between two sets of parameter estimates, and show that there are statistically significant differences between the two sets of estimated parameters, leading to different distributions of predicted probabilities of default. We also apply the estimated parameters onto a common test set to show how each set of parameters would give different predictions for probabilities of the default, and find that the models underestimate and overestimate default rates at different duration times of the loan.
We then investigated the three possible sources leading to the change in the distributions of hazards before and after the crisis: the difference in the quality of the cohort accepted under different economic conditions, the drastically different economic conditions that were seen in the UK economy, or the different estimated parameters. This was done by selecting two cohorts, one representing a cohort of loans accepted during a non-downturn period (i.e. loans that were accepted Based on these two selected cohorts, we then created four related test sets holding constant either cohort quality or the economic conditions, and by applying either set of estimated parameters, we get 8 different scored test sets, which we then compare pair-wise.
We find that changes in cohort, macroeconomic conditions and the estimated parameters all contribute towards the change in the distributions of predicted probabilities of default. Our results show that the model developed on downturn data consistently gives higher predicted probabilities of default, and this held across different macroeconomic conditions and cohorts, perhaps suggesting that using non-downturn data in model development would lead to a falsely optimistic view and underestimate probabilities of default. Depending on whether the model was developed on nondownturn or downturn data, differences in cohort might or might not be picked up by the estimated parameters -our results show that whilst parameter estimates from non-downturn data suggest lower hazards for the post-crisis cohort in line with expectations, the parameter estimates from downturn data was not able to pick it up. However, it is the effects of changes in macroeconomic conditions that are most difficult to unravel. Moving from pre-to post-crisis macroeconomic conditions, the model developed on non-downturn data predicts that hazards would increase for the post-crisis cohort yet decrease for the pre-crisis cohort, suggesting that different macroeconomic conditions affect different people at different times differently. Yet, doing the same comparison using a model developed on downturn data, we find a large decrease in estimated hazards. All these imply that even though we have taken into account macroeconomic conditions and possible interactions between macroeconomic and application variables, the models are still unable to adequately model the various effects coming from type of borrower, the time during which borrowing takes place, and how macroeconomic conditions would affect different individuals differently.
There is much further work to be done. Kelly et al. (1999) theorized that a model which is able to take into account all known and unknown predictor variables would be able to adapt to changes in the underlying population but that this is not always possible to achieve. While we have considered most major economic indicators (for which data was available), these variables were still unable to adequately represent all of the required predictor variables, hence the significantly different parameter estimates after the credit crisis. Further variables that can be considered include random variables to account for unknown heterogeneity, perhaps that are either or both of individualspecific and time-specific. More work is also required in the exploration and quantification of the effects of macroeconomic variation and cohort quality on probabilities of default, as well as the other components of risk in the calculation of loss.
